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Peter M. McDermott*

Equitable Damages in
Nova Scotia

I ChanceryAmendmentAct 1858 (LordCairns'Act)
Section 2 of the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (Lord Cairns'Act)l
conferred jurisdiction upon the Court of Chancery to award damages, in
certain instances, either in addition to or in substitution for an injunction
or specific performance. Lord Cairns'Actwas based upon the report of
the Chancery Commissioners who recommended that courts of equity
should be empowered to award damages in a suit for an injunction, or for
the specific performance of a contract.2 It may have been thought that the
raison d'tre of Lord Cairns' Act would have ceased upon the
commencement of the JudicatureAct 1873. However, Lord Cairns'Act
did not merely enable the Court of Chancery to award those damages
which could be awarded by a common law court. This issue was finally
settled by the decision of the House of Lords in Leeds IndustrialCo4
operativeSociety v. Slack
In the Leeds case the ancient lights of the plaintiff would in time have
been obstructed by buildings which were being erected by the defendant.
The plaintiff was granted an injunction to restrain the construction of
those buildings. The House of Lords held that Lord Cairns'Actconferred
jurisdiction, in these circumstances, to award damages in lieu of this quia
timet injunction. The decision of the House of Lords sanctioned the
award of damages in equity to a plaintiff who had not sustained any
injury. This jurisdiction to award equitable damages for prospective loss
may be contrasted with the position at common law where damages may
5
only be awarded in respect of an actual injury sustained by a plaintiff.
The decision also finally settled the question of whether the jurisdiction
conferred by Lord Cairns'Act survived the repeal of the statute. The
Leeds case, therefore, settled what Professor Heuston has referred to as a
"vexed question". 6 The decision was controversial as the plaintiff had
only sought injunctive relief to protect his proprietary rights. 7
*LL.M. (Qld.), Barrister-at-Law (Qld.), Law Reform Commission of Queensland, Australia.
1. 21 & 22 Vict. c.27 (Imp.). For the text of s.2 of the Lord Cairns'Ac see Appendix.
2. See "Third Report of Her Majesty's Commissioners Appointed to Inquire into the Process,
Practice and System of Pleading in the Court of Chancery" (Command 2064, 1856).
3. Supreme Courtof JudicatureAc, 1873 (36 & 37 Vict. c.66) (Imp.).
4. [1924] A.C. 851.
5. See Backhouse v. Bonomi (1861), 9 HL. C.503.
6. See R.EV. Heuston, Lives ofttheLord Chancellors1885-1940 (1964), at 349.
7. See (1925) 41 Law Quarterly Review 3. See also R.E. Megarry, Miscellany-at-Law
(1969), at 71.
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The relevance of equitable damages was recently exemplified in
Barbagallo v. J. & E Catelan Pty. Ltd8 In that case the defendants had
excavated their land near its boundary with the plaintiffs' land. The
excavation did not encroach on the plaintiffs' land, but would do so in the
future. The plaintiffs recovered damages in respect of the cost of
stabilising the bank. This award of damages was not justifiable at
common law as the plaintiff had not sustained any actual damage.
However, it was held that the plaintiffs were entitled to hold the
judgment in their favour as equitable damages under Lord Cairns'Act
could be awarded to the plaintiffs for the cost of stabilising the bank. The
distinction between common law damages and equitable damages was
emphasised in the judgments in this case. The fact that an award of
equitable damages may include a component for prospective loss was
recognised. McPherson J. remarked: "Damages for prospective losses
arising out of an apprehended future withdrawal of support are
recoverable only in equity and not at common law". 9 Thomas J.
observed that Lord Cairns'Act "enabled assessments of damages to be
made which were, for practical purposes, once and for all assessments".1 0
Jurisdiction to award equitable damages in England (and Wales) is
now conferred by s.50 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.11 Section 50 of
the Supreme CourtAct provides:
Where the Court of Appeal or the High Court has jurisdiction to entertain
an application for an injunction or specific performance, it may award
damages in addition to, or in substitution for, an injunction or specific
performance.
This provision appears to have been derived from s.92 of the Judicature
(Nothern Ireland)Act 1978.12 Section 50 of the English Supreme Court
Act does not contain terms which are contained in Lord Cairns'Ac such
as "injured" or "wrongful act", which may arguably impose jurisdictional
constraints upon a court. 13 It might be mentioned that s.50 of the
Supreme Court Act has been adopted in a number of jurisdictions,
including Ontario 14, Victoria' 5, Hong Kong,16 and Manitoba.17
8. [1986] 1 Qd.R. 245.
9. [1986] 1 Qd.R. 245, at 256.
10. [1986] 1 Qd.R. 245, at 262.
11. 1981, c.54 (U.K.).
12. 1978, c. 23 (U.K.).
13. See, eg.: Attorney-General v. BirkenheadBorough, [1968] NZ.L.R. 383, at 393; Neville
Nitschke Caravans(MainNorth Road) Ply.Ltd v. McEntree (1976), 15 S.A.S.R. 330, at 351;
Talbot v. GeneralTelevision Corp.Pty. Lt9 [1980] V.R. 224, at 241, 243; [1981] R.P.C. 1, at
19,21.
14. See." Courts ofJusticeAc S.O. 1984, c.11, s. 112.
15. See Supreme CourtAc, 1986 (1986 No.1 10), s.38.
16. See: Supreme Court Ordinancecap.4, s.17 (rev. ed. 1987).
17. See: The Courtof Queen'sBenchAc, S.M. 1988, c.4, s.36.
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ff.Jurisdictionto Award EquitableDamagesin Nova Scotia
In the colony of Nova Scotia the Governor was originally also the
Chancellor of the colony. It was a common practice for the Governor of
a British colony to exercise the jurisdiction of the Lord Chancellor within
that colony. 18 For instance, the Governor of Prince Edward Island also
exercised jurisdiction as the Chancellor of that colony.19 With the

development of Nova Scotia provision was later made in 1833 for the
Master of the Rolls to exercise primary jurisdiction in Chancery;
however, all decrees that were to be enrolled still had to be signed by the
Chancellor.20 The Nova Scotia "Court of Chancery" was abolished under
the 1859 revision of the Nova Scotia statutes which vested the Supreme
21
Court with Chancery jurisdiction.
In 1864 the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia was also later vested with
Chancery jurisdiction under "An Act in Respect of Courts and Judicial
Officers, and Proceedings in Special Cases".22 Section 1 of this statute
provided: "The Supreme Court shall have within this province the same
powers as are exercised by the courts of queen's bench, common pleas,
chancery and exchequer in England". It is not entirely apparent that this
provision also vested the statutory jurisdiction of the Court of Chancery,
as well as the original jurisdiction of that court. An 1873 consolidated
statute relating to "Procedure in Equity"' made it clear that the equity
jurisdiction of the court was to be confined to the "Court of the Equity
Judge" (s. 1). That this equity jurisdiction was to be separately exercised
was evident from s.22 of this consolidating statute which provided: "No
cause of action heretofore denominated legal shall be contained in a writ
or declaration which seeks equitable relief'. An exception was, however,
provided in s.53 of this statute which was expressed to apply where a
plaintiff sought "a writ of injunction against the repetition or continuance
of such breach of contract or other injury, or the committal of any breach
of contract or injury of a like kind arising out of the same contract or
relating to the same property or right". Section 53 enabled a plaintiff "in
the same action" to "include a claim for damages or other redress".
Section 53 appears to have originated in the 1859 revision of the Nova
18. See A. Stokes, Constitution of the British Colonies (1788), at 185. See also J. Chitty,
Prerogativesofthe Crown (1820), at 36.
19. See F. MacKinnon, The Government of PrinceEdwardIsland,(1951), at 36.
20. See eg., Chancery Act 1833 ("An Act for amending the Practice of the Court of
Chancery and diminishing the Expences thereof") 3 Will. IV, c. 52 (Nova Scotia), s.6 The
revised statutes of 1851 continued the requirement for the Chancellor to sign all decrees to be
enrolled: see R.S.N.S. 1851, c.127, s.5.
21. See RLS.N.S. 1859, c.127.
22. See R.S.N.S. 1864, c.123.
23. See C.S.N.S. 1873, c.95.
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Scotia statutes. 24 The provision merely enabled common law damages, a
"legal" remedy, to be awarded in injunction proceedings. Section 53 did
not confer jurisdiction to award equitable damages as it did not, unlike
Lord Cairns'Ac4 enable damages to be awarded "in substitution" for an
injunction. No statutory provision which corresponds to s.2 of Lord
Cairns'Actever appears to have been enacted in Nova Scotia.
The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia was later constituted under The
Nova Scotia JudicatureAc4 1884.25 Section 8(1) of the JudicatureAct
provided:
The Supreme Court shall have within this Province the same powers as
were formerly exercised by the Courts of Queen's Bench, Common Pleas,
Chancery and Exchequer, in England; and also such and the same powers
as were on the nineteenth day of April, A.D. 1884, exercised in England
by the Supreme Court of Judicature, save in respect of Probate and
Surrogate Courts.
This provision would be the present source of jurisdiction of the court
to award equitable damages under Lord Cairns'Act The provision, by
including a reference to the 19th April, 1884, would presumably be
construed as including any statutory jurisdiction possessed by the English
High Court on that date. Successive revisions of the JudicatureAct have
provided for the continuation of the court as originally constituted. 26 The
continuation of the court in this manner would have the consequence that
the jurisdiction of the court under Lord Cairns'Act would have been
27
preserved.
11. Award ofEquitableDamagesin Nova Scotia
It is apparent from the terms of s.2 of the Lord Cairns' Act that the
jurisdiction conferred by this section may be exercised where the court
has "jurisdiction to entertain" an application for:
(a) an injunction, or
(b) specific performance.
This article will discuss the exercise of jurisdiction under Lord Cairns'
Act in Nova Scotia in these classes of case. It should be mentioned, as a
preliminary matter, that the words "jurisdiction to entertain" in Lord
Cairns' Act have been interpreted to mean that a court possesses the
24. See R.S.N.S. 1859, c.127, s.25.
25. See R.S.N.S. (5th ser.) 1884, c. 104.
26. See, eg. JudicatureAc R.S.N.S. 1900, c.155, s.3; JudicatureAc S.N.S. 1919, c.32, s.3;
JudicatureAc S.N.S. 1950, s.3; JudicatureAc4 S.N.S. 1972, c.2, s.2. See also: Deruelle v.
Children'sAid Society of CapeBreton (1978), 26 N.S.R. (2d.) 125, at 128.
27. Cf., St Anne-Nakawic Pulp & PaperCo. Lid v. CanadianPaper Workers' Union, Local
219, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 704, at 727 where the Supreme Court of Canada considered similar
legislation which constitutes the Supreme Court of New Brunswick.
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requisite jurisdiction to award equitable damages despite the absence of
a plea for such relief, and notwithstanding that there is a discretionary bar
28
to the grant of an injunction or specific performance.
L Injunction
The Supreme Court of Nova Scotia has in a number of injunction cases
recognised the existence of the jurisdiction to award equitable damages.
In most of these cases the courts have not expressly acknowledged Lord
Cairns'Act as the source of this jurisdiction. However, there have been
references in some of the cases to the "working rule" enunciated by A.L.
Smith L.J. in Shelfer v. City of London Electric Lighting Co. 29 In that
case an injunction was issued to restrain a nuisance caused by vibrations
from the operations of machinery of an electric lighting company. A.L.
Smith L.J., in considering the availability of the jurisdiction under Lord
Cairns'Actto award damages in substitution for an injunction, made the
following observations:
In my opinion, it may be stated as a good working rule that (1) If the injury to the plaintiff's legal rights is small,
(2) And is one which is capable of being estimated in money,
(3) And the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the defendant
to grant an injunction:
- then damages in substitution for an injunction
30
may be given.
It is clear that A.L. Smith L.J. was not formulating an inflexible rule. The
Lord Justice later remarked that the determination of each matter in the
"working rule" "must be left to the good sense of the tribunal which deals
with each case as it comes up for adjudication". 31 This was recognised in
Duchman v. Dairy Co. Ltd3 2 where Master J.A. remarked that "the rule
33
in the Shelfer case does not purport to be exhaustive".
Most of the Nova Scotia cases in which the "working rule" has been
cited concern building encroachments. In these cases the courts have
recognised the existence of a discretionary power vested in the court
whereby the court may either grant a mandatory injunction to restrain a
continuing trespass or award damages in lieu of an injunction.34 It will be
28. See, eg., Barbagallov. £ & E CatelanPty. Ltd, [1986] 1 Qd.R. 245, at 251.
29. [1895] 1 Ch. 287.
30. [1895] 1 Ch. 287, at 322-323.
31. [1985] 1 Ch. 287, at 323.
32. (1928), 63 O.L.R. 111, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 9.
33. (1928) 63 O.L.R. 111, at 120, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 9, at 24. See also, Denison v. CarroSuel
FarmsLtd (1981), 129 D.L.R. (3d) 334,342.
34. Sea Gallant v. MacDonald (1970), 3 N.S.R. (2d) 137, at 146, 160; Andrews v. R.A.
Douglas Ltd (1975), 17 N.S.R. (2d) 209, at 216 (no trespass found); Dempsey v. J.E.S.
Developments Ltd (1976), 15 N.S.R (2d) 448, at 453; MacDonald v. Lawrence (1980), 38
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recalled that the Shelfer case concerned a nuisance, and the courts have,
by analogy, applied the "working rule" to cases of trespass. In some
building encroachment cases the "working rule" would be inappropriate.
One example is where a building, which constitutes a minor
encroachment, is erected by a defendant who has notice of a plaintiff's
objection. 35 In building encroachment cases the courts have to balance
various competing interests. An evaluation has to be made as to the
consequences of the removal of a building as against the vindication of
the proprietary rights of an individual. The decision whether to grant
injunctive relief, or award equitable damages must, of course, ultimately
depend upon a case-by-case analysis.
One Nova Scotia decision, concerning a building encroachment, in
which the Shelfer case was cited, is Gallantv. MacDonald36 In that case
the defendant's residence was partially constructed upon the plaintiffs'
residential building lot. The plaintiffs were unable to acquire a building
permit to build a house on this lot because of the encroachment. Cowan
C.J.T.D. made a general observation that "where the encroachment is
slight and the cost of removal would be great, the corresponding benefit
to the adjoining owners small, or where compensation by way of
damages can be determined and can be had, a court will ordinarily
decline to compel removal and will leave the party complaining to his
remedy at law in damages". 37 The court assessed the diminution in value
of the plaintiffs' lands caused by the continuing trespass but regarded such
a remedy as clearly inadequate. Cowan C.J.T.D. remarked: "If I decide
that the plaintiffs should receive only damages, they will be left with a lot
of land which, at the present time, is incapable of being put to the only
use for which it is suited, namely, the construction of a dwellinghouse".3 8
It was, therefore, held that the plaintiff would be granted a mandatory
injunction for the removal of the encroachment, as well as damages for
the trespass already committed. The Chief Justice observed that factors
that may induce a court to award damages in lieu of injunctive relief
would be where the plaintiff was guilty of laches, or was guilty of conduct
inducing the defendant to proceed with the construction of a building
when, to the knowledge of the plaintiff, the building was on land owned

N.S.R. (2d) 319, at 326-327,40 N.S.R. (2d) 626; Brean v. Thorne (1982), 52 N.S.R. (2d) 241,
at 245-246.
35. Cf., Krehl v.Burrell(1877),7 Ch.D. 551; (1879), 11 Ch.D. 146.
36. (1970), 3 N.S.R. (2d) 137.
37. (1970), 3 N.S.R. (2d) 137, at 142. An award of equitable damages for prospective loss that
is made in substitution for an injunction is not a remedy which is available at law. The remedy
originated in the jurisdiction which was vested in the Court of Chancery by Lord Cairns'Act
38. (1970), 3 N.S.R. (2d) 137, at 142.
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by the plaintiff.39 Cowan C.J.T.D. also acknowledged the relevance of

Lord Cairns'Actwhen, in discussing the Shelfer case, he remarked: "The
Court of Appeal found that Lord Cairns'Act (21 & 22 Vict. c. 27) in
conferring upon Courts of Equity ajurisdiction to award damages instead

principles upon which those
of an injunction, did not alter the settled
40

Courts interfered by way of injunction".
In Brean v. Thorne4 the parties were adjacent landowners. The
defendants had built a house on the plaintiffs' property mistakenly
believing it to be their own. In these circumstances the court did not
consider that this was a case in which the Shelfer case could properly be
applied. Rogers 3. commented:
The facts in this case are far more serious than in the Gallant case. The
encroachment amounts to a complete usurpation, an expropriation if you
will, of the plaintiffs' rights to their property. Quite clearly, when the tests
set out in the Shelfer case are applied, it is not difficult to reach the
conclusion, and I do so, that the injury to the plaintiffs of their rights is not
small, it is one that is not capable of being adequately estimated in money,
and cannot be adequately compensated by a small money payment. 42
In Brean v. Thorne43 the court granted the plaintiffs a mandatory
injunction to compel the removal of the house from their property. The
fact that the plaintiffs made relatively little use of their property, which
was not entirely unique, was regarded as not to the point. Rogers J.
remarked: "But it is going too far to say that in those circumstances

damages in exchange for a deed or a court-compelled exchange of deeds
to Lots A-1 and A-2 is the appropriate remedy". 44 The defendants
39. (1970), 3 N.S.R. (2d) 137, at 160.
40. (1970), 3 N.S.R. (2d) 137, at 145. The decision in Gallantv. MacDonaldalso decided an
interesting point concerning veterans' finance. The Director under the Veterans' Land Act
(R.S.C. 1952, c. 280, now the Veterans' Land Ac R.S.C. 1970, CV-4) was added as a
defendant after the issue of the writ. The Director submitted that although the fee simple of the
land was vested in the Director, the Director was in the position of being a mere mortgagee,
and should not be liable in any way for the encroachment and continuing trespass. The
Veterans' Land Act provided that a veteran holding or occupying land sold by the Director
shall, until the Director grants or conveys the land to him, be deemed a tenant at will (s.12).
Also, the Act provided that the title, ownership, and right of possession of all property sold to
a veteran shall generally remain in the Director until the sale price and other charges are fully
paid. However, the Director could transfer the title to property without prejudicing the
entitlement of the Director to payment of relevant moneys (s.13). This legislation was
obviously intended to ensure that the home of a veteran should not be taken in execution under
proceedings issued by a creditor of a veteran. Cowan C.J.T.D. held that "the Director is
responsible for the continuing trespass constituted by the encroachment of the MacDonald
house and its associated works" (at 142).
41. (1982), 52 N.S.R. (2d) 241.
42. (1982), 52 N.S.R. (2d) 241, at 246.
43. (1982), 52 N.S.R. (2d) 241.
44. (1982), 52 N.S.R. (2d) 241, at 246.
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obtained partial indemnification from a real estate agency and its
employees who showed the defendants the wrong property at the time of
purchase. However, the court did not give any indemnification for the
cost of construction of the house beyond the footings. This was because
municipal regulations provided that any construction should not proceed
beyond the footage stage without obtaining the required building permit
based on a surveyor's certificate. Rogers J. observed that "that is a
45
complicated and expensive remedial regimen".
The courts in Nova Scotia have shown a general reluctance in building
encroachment cases to award equitable damages in substitution for
injunctive relief. This is because the award of equitable damages in lieu
of an injunction is an interference with the proprietary rights of a plaintiff.
This attitude was evident in MacDonald v. Lawrence"6 were Glube 3.
remarked:
When dealing with land, wherever possible, the court should not interject
itself as an expropriating authority requiring a party to give up any portion
of their land 47
unless they are mutually willing to reach that
accommodation.
In that case the court ordered the removal of a wall which encroached
on the plaintiffs land. It has been seen from cases such as Gallant v.
MacDonald 8 and Brean v. Thorn49 that the courts will, in appropriate
instances, compel the removal of a house. Earlier in this century, in
GilpinvilleLtd v. Dumaresq,50 the court ordered the removal of a garage
that was erected in breach of a restrictive covenant not to erect a building
that would interfere with a view.
One Nova Scotia building encroachment case where the jurisdiction to
award equitable damages in lieu of an injunction was exercised is
Dempsey v. J.E.S. Developments Ltd 5 1 In that case the defendant
constructed a warehouse that encroached onto the plaintiff's land by 35
square feet. The damages were assessed on the basis of the rent that the
defendant would receive. MacIntosh . held that an award of damages
was appropriate in the circumstances for to grant a mandatory injunction
ordering the removal of the building from the plaintiff's lands would
involve great costs to the defendant. The award of damages also included
a component for exemplary damages as the conduct of the representative
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

(1982), 52 N.S.R. (2d) 241, at 258.
(1980), 40 N.S.R. (2d) 137, at 160.
(1980), 40 N.S.R. (2d) 626, at 627.
(1970), 3 N.S.R. (2d) 137.
(1980), 40 N.S.R. (2d) 626.
[1927] 1 D.L.R. 730 (N.S.S.C.).
(1979) 15 N.S.R. (2d) 448.

Equitable Damages in Nova Scotia

of the defendant company was abusive and contemptuous of the
plaintiff's rights. Upon payment of these damages the plaintiff was
required to execute a release of her interest in the encroached land. It
might be mentioned that in some jurisdictions the courts have been
empowered to grant relief upon terms where a building is mistakenly
52
erected.
The approach of the courts in Nova Scotia may be contrasted with the
decision of Graham J. in Bracewell v. Appleby53, which is illustrative of
the consequences of laches on the part of a plaintiff. In that case the
defendant erected a house over a right of way of the plaintiff. The
plaintiffs had delayed in enforcing their legal rights until the house was
built. The plaintiffs were aware that the house would be built, and the
defendant wrongly asserted his entitlement to build the house. Graham 3.
remarked:
The plaintiffs kept on threatening to bring proceedings, but in fact stood
by until the house was erected, and the defendant, whilst insisting that he
had a right of way by virtue of the grant, in fact never took any
proceedings, for example, to obtain a declaration
to that effect and pushed
4
ahead until the house was afaitaccompli
In these circumstances the plaintiffs were awarded equitable damages in
lieu of an injunction. Graham J. later remarked that "the plaintiffs have
established their legal right, and by reason of the ChanceryAmendment
Act 1858 (Lord Cairns'Act) they can ask for, and the court can grant,
55
damages in lieu of an injunction".
The jurisdiction under Lord Cairns'Act is also of relevance where a
plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to enforce riparian rights. In Lockwood v.
Brentwood Park Investments Ltd 56 the Appeal Division of the Nova
Scotia Supreme Court dissolved an injunction to prevent the restriction
of the flow of a brook, and instead awarded damages for loss of amenities
to the riparian owner. In this case the court cited the "working rule" in
the Shelfer case. Although the plaintiff claimed general damages there
was no evidence before the trial judge of any actual pecuniary loss.
Dubinsky . awarded the plaintiff damages of $2,400 for "the loss of the
52. See ConveyancingandLaw ofPropertyAct R.S.O. 1980, c.90. s.37. This reform has been
adopted in Queensland where there were a number of instances of homes being built on the
wrong allotment, in some cases, on canal estates consisting of reclaimed land which did not
have any obvious landmarks. See' PropertyLaw Act 1974 (No. 76 of 1974) (QId.), ss.
195198. See also Report of the Law Reform Commission of Queensland, PropertyLaw Reform
(Q.L.R.C. 16, 1973), at 86-87.
53. [1975] Ch. 408.
54. [1975] Ch. 408, at 415.
55. [1975] Ch. 408, at 419.
56. (1970), 1 N.S.R. (2d) 669.
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pleasure which the plaintiff had formerly enjoyed when the brook flowed
57
in greater volume past his land".
2.Specific Performance
It has already been mentioned that the jurisdiction to award equitable
damages under Lord Cairns' Act may also be invoked where specific
performance is sought. The jurisdiction has relevance in cases of part
performance. It has been settled since the decision of Pollock C.B. in
Massey v. Johnson 8 that the doctrine of part performance does not
enable a plaintiff to recover damages in an action upon a parole contract
which is required to be in writing. However, it is accepted that a plaintiff
may be awarded equitable damages where the entitlement of a plaintiff
to relief is dependent upon the operation of the doctrine.5 9 This was
recognised in Lavery v. Pursell60 by Chitty J. who remarked: "It was
suggested that after Lord Cairns' Act the Court of Equity could give
damages in lieu of specific performance, yes, but it must be in a case
where specific performance could have been given". 61 This case was
explained in Price v. Strange 2 by Goff L.J. who commented: "In my
view, that case decides nothing more than this, that the court cannot grant
damages in lieu of specific performance when it is impossible to effect
63
specific performance".
This jurisdiction to award equitable damages in cases of part
performance has been considered in a number of Nova Scotia cases. In
Dominion Supply and Construction Co. v. Foley Brothers64 an action was
brought for the breach of a verbal contract for the purchase of sand and
gravel. The sand and gravel were to be supplied in accordance with the
specification of government engineers and were subject to their approval.
A portion of the material, which was approved, was accepted and paid
for, the balance being obtained from another source. The appeal court
affirmed the decision of the trial judge that there was no liability on the

57. (1970), 1 N.S.R. (2d) 669, at 705.
58. (1847), 1 Ex. 241 (154 E.R. 102).
59. See J.M. Maclntyre, "Equity - Damages in Place of Specific Performance" (1969), 47
Canadian Bar Review 644; M.G. Bridge, "The Statute of Frauds and Sale of Land Contracts"
(1986), 64 Canadian Bar Review 57. See also R.A. Brewer, "A Comparison of Lavery v.
Pursell and McIntyre v. Stockdale" (1947), 1 (1)University of New Brunswick Law School
Journal 25.
60. (1888), 39 Ch.D. 508.
61. (1888), 39 Ch.D. 508, at 518.
62. [1978] Ch. 337.
63. [1978] Ch. 337, at 359.
64. (1919), 53 N.S.R. 333.
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part of the defendants to pay for the material which was rejected by the
Government engineers.
The court in the Dominion Supply case considered the relevance of the
doctrine of part performance in an action for damages. Ritchie E.J.
remarked:
Part performance is relied on to take the case out of the statute. The
answer to this point is that part performance is an equitable doctrine, and
only to be applied where specific performance could on that ground be
decreed. In this case it was admitted that specific performance had become
impossible. In Lavery v. Pursel 39 Ch. D. page 518, Mr. Justice Chitty
said:
Now this question of part performance resolves itself into this. Part
performance was an equitable doctrine, and, putting it shortly, where
there was performance under the contract it took the case out of the
statute, but it was an equitable doctrine applied by the courts of equity,
and it was applied in those cases where the court would grant specific
performance, for instance the case of a sale of land, but if before the
JudicatureAct the court dismissed the bill because it was not a case for
specific performance, a court of law, when asked to give damages, the
contract not being within the fourth section, had no alternative but to
refuse and to give judgment for the defendant in the action. But since
the various amendments which have taken place in the law with regard
to equitable doctrines, it has never been decided, so far as I am aware,
that the equitable doctrine of part performance can be made use of for
the purpose of obtaining damages on a contract at law.
The result is that I feel myself driven to give effect to the Statute of
Frauds.65
The judgment of Ritchie E.J. in the Dominion Supply case correctly
reflects the position where common law damages are sought in a case of
part performance. However, the judgment does not contain any
consideration of the jurisdiction to award equitable damages under Lord
Cairns'Act.The quotation which was taken from the judgment of Chitty
J. in Lavery v. Pursel66 did not include that later part of the judgment
that acknowledges the existence of the jurisdiction to award. equitable
damages where a plaintiff possesses an equity to a decree of specific
performance. The fact that the jurisdiction under Lord Cairns'Act was
not explained in the Dominion Supply case may have affected the course
of future authority. However, it is acknowledged that the actual decision
in that case was quite unexceptionable.
In Carterv. Irving Oil CO.67 an action was brought for damages for the
breach of an oral agreement for a lease of a service station. A written
65. (1919), 53 N.S.R. 333, at 348.
66. (1888), 39 Ch.D. 508.
67. [1952] 4 D.L.R. 128.
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memorandum in relation to the lease had been signed by a person who
had no authority to bind the defendant. There were various acts of part
performance on the part of the plaintiff, and any entitlement of the
plaintiff to damages could only be derived from Lord Cairns' Act
MacDonald . remarked:
Part performance can only enable an action of damages to succeed (where
s. 7 of the Statute of Fraudsis not satisfied) if the case in hand is one in
which specific performance would otherwise have been granted by the
Court of Chancery; and neither Lord Cairns'Act of 1858 [c.27] nor the
fusion of law and equity declared by the JudicatureAct affects this result.68
This analysis again does not acknowledge that the jurisdiction to award
equitable damages in cases of part performance is derived from Lord
Cairns' Act MacDonald J. did not award damages as the contract was
not susceptible to specific performance because there was a requirement
of constant supervision of continuing acts of personal service. McCallum
v. MacKenzie 9 is a similar Nova Scotia decision in which it was held that
damages could not be awarded as the doctrine of part performance did
not apply to a contract for personal services. In that case the contract
concerned an agreement to buy an accounting practice.
The courts have traditionally declined to decree specific performance
because of the difficulties of supervision of any decree. 70 It has been
suggested that it is for this reason that equitable damages could not be
awarded for breaches of a contract for personal services. 71 Itis, however,
submitted that courts of equity have adopted changing attitudes in
considering whether to decree specific performance of personal services.
There are recent English cases which show that a court will now more
readily exercise jurisdiction to make an order for the specific performance
of a contract for personal services. 72 From early times it is clear that the
remedy of specific performance has always been available to compel
performance of such contracts. 73 It has long been recognised that the fact
that a contract requires personal supervision does not prevent a court
from decreeing specific performance to ensure that an injustice is
74
redressed.
68. [1952] 4 D.L.R. 128 at 133.
69. (1979), 37 N.S.R. (2d) 328, at 246-347.
70. See, eg., Ryan v. Mutual Tontine Westminster Chambers Association [1893] 1 Ch. 116.
71. See T. Iugman & . Wakefield, "Equitable Damages under Lord Cairns'Ac', [1981]
Conveyancer & Property Lawyer 286, at 292. See also, Elliott v. Roberts (1912), 28 T.L.R.
436.
72. See, e-g., C.I Giles & Co. Ltd v. Morris,[1972] 1 WL.R. 307, at 318; Shiloh Spinners
Ltd v. Harding, [1973] A.C. 691, at 724; Tito v. Waddell (No.2), [1977] Ch. 106, at 321-322.
73. See J. Berryman, "The Specific Performance Damages Continuum: An Historical
Perspective" (1985), 17 Ottawa Law Review 295.
74. See Wilson v. FurnessRailway Co. (1869), L.R. 9 Eq. 28, at 33.
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There are still, however, modem indications of a reluctance to decree
specific performance of contracts for personal services. Recently, in
Scandinavian Trading Tanker Co. A.B. v. Flota PetroleraEcuatoriana75
Lord Diplock stated that "this is a remedy that English Courts have
always disclaimed any jurisdiction to grant". 76 In Canada, in Emerald
Resources Ltd v. Sterling Oil PropertiesManagement Ltd 77 Allen J.A.
stated "that it would be improper to make one man serve another against
his will". 78 Such statements of principle pay no regard to any necessity to
give a party to a contract relief where no remedy at law is available. It
is submitted that the modem view is that a court possesses jurisdiction to
decree specific performance of a contract of personal services. In such
circumstances a, court would not necessarily make an order for the
specific performance of a contract. Nevertheless, a court would
notionally exercise the jurisdiction to adjudge that a plaintiff possesses an
equity for an order for the specific performance of a contract, and thereby
award equitable damages. Such an award would be made "in
substitution" for an order for specific performance. Consequently, there
would be no order requiring any supervision by a court, nor would such
an award be objectionable on policy grounds.
IV Assessment of EquitableDamages
In a number of Canadian contract cases concerning the sale of land
equitable damages have been assessed on a different basis from common
law damages. 79 This approach can be seen to have originated in the

judgment of Megarry J. in Wroth v. Tyler 0 where damages for the breach
of a contract of sale of land were assessed as at the date of judgment to
take account of the realities of inflation. The value of the land had
escalated in value since the date of the breach of the contract which was
the usual date for the assessment of damages. The assessment of damages
in this manner was innovative at the time, although there were earlier
precedents for this course of action.81
In England the decision of the House of Lords in Johnson v. Agnews2
has recently emphasised the compensatory function of damages. Lord
75. [1983] 2 A.C. 694.
76. Id, at 701.
77. (1969), 3 D.L.R. (3d) 630.
78. Id, at 647.
79. See ag., BJ. Reiter & RJ. Sharpe, "Wroth v. 7yler Must Equity Remedy Contract
Damages?" (1979), 3 Canadian Business Law Journal 146; E. Veitch, "An Equitable Export
-Lord Cairns'Actin Canada" (1980), 12 Ottawa Law Review 227.
80. [1974] Ch. 30.
81. See, eg.:Horsnailv.Shute, [1921] 2 W.W.R. 270,62 D.L.R. 199;Bosaidv.Andry,[1963]
V.R. 465.
82. [1980] A.C. 367.
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Wilberforce considered that Lord Cairns'Act provided no warrant for
the assessment of damages on a different basis from common law
damages in a case where both remedies are available. His Lordship also
observed that there was no invariable principle that damages should be
assessed as at the date of breach as the court could find some other date
that might be appropriate in the circumstances.8 3 Dr. Spry has remarked:
"The observations of Lord Wilberforce can hardly have been intended to
exclude equitable considerations in cases where equitable damages are
sought".8 4 Professor Gareth Jones, in his review of Dr Spry's work, has
stated that he is in agreement with this observation.85
The judgment of Lord Wilberforce in Johnson v. Agnew8 6 did not
contain any discussion of the fact that an award of damages under Lord
Cairns' Act is an equitable remedy which is exercised according to
equitable considerations. Therefore, any claim for equitable damages is
subject to equitable defences, e.g., delay, acquiesence. This was earlier
recognised by the Supreme Court of Canada in Elsley v. J.G. Collins
Insurance Agencies Ltd87 The judgment of the court in this case was
delivered by Dickson J. who remarked:
The award is still governed, however, by special equitable considerations
which would not apply if the plaintiff were seeking damages at law rather
than in equity. These considerations might serve, for example, to reduce
the amount, due to such factors as delay or acquiesence. In addition, if the
parties have agreed on a set amount of damages at law, or a maximum
amount, it would be unconscionable, in my opinion, to allow recovery of
a greater amount of damages in equity.8
It remains to see how the courts in Canada continue to assess equitable
damages. It has even been suggested in British Columbia that there is no
difference between equitable damages and common law damages. In
Ansdell v. Crowther 9 Anderson J.A. remarked that "the judgements of
the House of Lords in Johnson v. Agnew90 make it clear that there is no
distinction between damages at common law and so-called 'equitable
damages', there is no fixed rule as to the date when damages ought be
assessed and, in order to do justice, the courts are empowered to fix
damages as of the date found to be appropriate in the circumstances". 91
83. Id, at 400-401.
84. See I.C.E. Spry, EquitableRemedies (3rd ed., 1984), at 610.
85. See G. Jones, (1982), 45 Modem Law Review 240.
86. [1980] A.C. 367.
87. [1978] 2 S.C.R. 916,83 D.L.R. (3d) 1.
88. [1978] 2 S.C.R. 916, at 935; 83 D.L.R. (3d) 1,at 13.
89. (1984), 55 B.C.L.R. 216, 11 D.L.R. (4th) 614.
90. [1980] A.C. 367.
91. (1984), 5 B.C.L.R. 216, at 221; 11 D.L.R. (4th) 614, at 619.
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This approach is contrary to the binding decision of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Elsley v. J G. CollinsInsuranceAgenciesLtd92
V Conclusion
Some Canadian commentators have commented upon or recognised the
absence of a statutory provision in Nova Scotia which corresponds to s.2
of Lord Cairns'Act.93 Any future revision of the Nova Scotia Judicature
Act should include a provision derived from s.50 of the Supreme Court
Act 1981 (Eng.) This provision has been adopted in Ontario and other
jurisdictions. The enactment of such a provision would make the
jurisdiction to award equitable damages evident to practitioners, and also
avoid jurisdictional arguments which may arise under Lord Cairns'Act.
92. Supra, note 87.
93. See S.M. Waddams, The Law of Damages (1983), at 52; G.H.L Fridman, The Law of
Contractin Canada(2nd ed., 1986), at 652.

Appendix
ChanceryAmendmentAct 1858 (LordCairns'Act)
(21 & 22 Vict. c. 27)
Section 2
In all cases in which the Court of Chancery has Jurisdiction to
entertain an Application for an Injunction against a Breach of any
Covenant, Contract, or Agreement, or against the Commission or
Continuance of any wrongful act, or for the Specific Performance of
any Covenant, Contract or Ageement, it shall be lawful for the same
Court, if it shall think fit, to award damages to the Party injured
either in addition to or in substitution for such Injunction or Specific
Performance, and such damages may be assessed in such manner as
the Court shall direct.

